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On Genesis
Louis Althusser
  Translated by Jason E. Smith
I would like to be more precise on one point, which no doubt was not very clear 
in my letter.
In the schema of the “theory of the encounter” or theory of “conjunction,” which 
is meant to replace the ideological (religious)
category of genesis, there is a place for what can be called linear genealogies.
To take up again, then, the example of the logic of the constitution of the capi-
talist mode of production in Capital:
1. the elements de!ned by Marx “combine” -- I prefer to say (in order to trans-
late the term Verbindung) “conjoin” by “taking hold” [prenant] in a new structure. 
"is structure cannot be thought, in its appearance, as the eﬀect of a !liation, 
but as the eﬀect of a conjunction. "is new Logic has nothing to do with the 
linear causality of !liation, nor with Hegelian “dialectical” logic, which only says 
out loud what is implicitly contained in the logic of linear causality.
2. And yet, each of the elements that come to be combined in the conjunction 
of the new structure (in this case, of accumulated money-capital, “free” labor-
power, that is, labor-power stripped of the instruments of labor, technological 
inventions) is itself, as such, a product, an eﬀect.
What is important in Marx’s demonstration is that the three elements are not 
contemporary products of one and the same situation. It is not, in other words, 
the feudal mode of production that, by itself, and through a providential !nality, 
engenders at the same time
the three elements necessary for the new structure to “take hold.” Each of these 
elements has its own “history,” or its own genealogy
(to take up a concept from Nietzsche that Balibar has used very well for this 
purpose): the three genealogies are relatively
independent. We even see Marx show that a single and same element (“free” 
labor-power) can be produced as the result of completely diﬀerent genealogies.
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"erefore the genealogies of the three elements are independent of one another, 
and independent (in their co-existence, in the co- existence of their respective 
results) of the existing structure (the feudal mode of production). Which ex-
cludes any possibility of a resurgence of the myth of genesis: the feudal mode of 
production is not the “father” of the capitalist mode of production in the sense 
that the latter would be contained “ as a seed” in the !rst.
3. "is said, it is still necessary to conceive the types of causality that might, 
concerning these elements (and, in a general manner, concerning the genealogy 
of any element) intervene in order to account for the production of these ele-
ments as elements entering into a conjunction that will “take hold” in a new 
structure.
We should, it seems to me, distinguish here between two distinct types of cau-
sality:
a. structural causality: an element can be produced as a structural eﬀect. Struc-
tural causality is the last [dernière] causality of every eﬀect.
What does the concept of structural causality mean? It signi!es (in crude terms) 
that an eﬀect B (considered as an element) is not the eﬀect of a cause A (an-
other element), but is instead the eﬀect of element A insofar as this element A 
is inserted into relations that constitute the structure in which A is situated [and 
caught up].1 "is means, in simple terms, that in order to comprehend the pro-
duction of eﬀect B, it is not enough to consider cause A (immediately preceding, 
or visibly related with eﬀect B) in an isolated manner, but cause A instead as an 
element of a structure in which it assumes a place, therefore as subject to rela-
tions, speci!c structural relations, that de!ne the structure in question. A very 
basic form of structural causality appears in modern physics, when it uses the 
concept of a !eld [champ], and puts into play what can be called the causality of 
a !eld. In the case of the science of societies, if we follow Marx’s thought, we 
cannot understand this or that economic eﬀect by relating it to an isolated cause, 
but only by relating it to the structure of the economic (de!ned by the articula-
1 [The text in brackets was added in Althusser's handwriting in the margins of the manuscript -- JES]
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tion of productive forces and relations of production). We can presume that in 
psychoanalysis such an eﬀect (such a symptom) is, in the
same way, only intelligible as the eﬀect of the structure of the unconscious. It is 
not this or that event or element A that produced an element B, but the de!ned 
structure of the unconscious of the subject that produces eﬀect B.
b. "is law seems to be general. But structural causality de!nes, as structural, 
therefore as structural eﬀect, rigorously de!ned and delimited zones or se-
quences, where structural causality is carried out in the form of linear causality. 
"is is what happens, for example, in the labor process. Linear, mechanical cau-
sality (even if it assumes complex forms, as in machines, these forms remain me-
chanical , that is, linear, even in feedback and other cybernetic eﬀects) is in play 
in an autonomous and exclusive fashion in a de!ned !eld, which is that of the 
production of products in the labor process.
In order to hammer in a nail, you hit a nail on the head, in order to work a 
!eld, you exert force on a plough which in turn acts on the earth, etc. "is 
linear-mechanical causality (what Sartre calls “analytical reason” . . . but, be care-
ful, what Sartre calls dialectical reason is, whatever he might say, only a complex 
form of analytical reason, is only analytical reason) acts then in producing the 
same eﬀects, by repetition and accumulation. It is what is found in Hegel when 
he speaks of quantitative accumulation, of the logic of the understanding. Hegel 
tried to think properly structural eﬀects in the form of a “qualitative leap,” that 
is, tried to pass from linear to structural causality by engendering the second 
from the !rst (and this is why his “dialectic” remains caught up in empirical 
categories of the mechanical and linear understanding, despite his declared sur-
passing of them, this “surpassing” -- Aufhebung -- being the concept that, de-
spite itself, admits and acknowledges this captivity.)
"ere are then entire sequences, but always de!ned within rigorous limits, !xed 
by structural causality, which are subject to the autonomous play of analytical or 
linear causality (or, transitive causality). "is is seen quite clearly in certain se-
quences of economic, political and ideological phenomena. "is should also be 
seen in psychoanalysis (for example, in certain sequences belonging to secondary 
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processes. It seems to me that what are called “secondary formations,” such as 
defense mechanisms [formations défensives ], take part in this).
In the example of our three elements, the accumulation of money-capital in-
volves this mechanism, as do certain productive sequences of other elements.
But in all of these cases, the limits and the “play” of mechanical causality as well 
as the type of object it produces are determined in the last instance by structural 
causality. We can even go farther, and say that (mechanical) eﬀects of accumula-
tion can be observed between structural eﬀects (such as Marx says when he says 
that the existence of “free labor-power” is the result of many diﬀerent, independ-
ent processes, whose eﬀects are added to and reinforce one another through ad-
dition) but these eﬀects, one of which is the instituting of the play of mechani-
cal causality, are, taken in isolation, structural eﬀects.
I won’t develop this further. I only want to indicate the principle of this double 
causality and its articulation, where structural causality determines linear causal-
ity.
September 22, 1966
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